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Globalization for Developmentl 
Inward FDI and the Size of the Market 
One of the recent policy 
concerns in the area of 
development is whether 
globalization really helps to 
improve standards of living in 
developing countries. 
International organizations 
advocate the merit of 
accessing the global economy 
via foreign direct investment. 
Anti-globalization movements 
do not necessarily agree with 
this view. Those opposing 
globalization argue that self-
interested multinational 
companies exploit the 
resources of developing 
countries and impair 
development. Thus, for the 
purpose of long run economic 
growth, it may be better to 
protect domestic infant 
industries rather than rely on 
foreign capital. 
This article considers a 
policy issue of whether 
enlarged markets would result 
from closer ties with foreign-
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owned multinational com-
panies during the development 
process. Whereas the gains 
from free trade have been 
thoroughly explored in the 
trade literature, very few 
attempts have been made at 
proving the trade of 
multinational companies is a 
more effective growth engine 
than the trade of domestic 
companies. Recent empirical 
literature (Levine & Renelt, 
1992; Harrison, 1996; 
Frankel & Romer, 1999) 
shows a positive relationship 
between trade and growth. 
This relationship is not 
sufficient, however, to 
conclude that multinational 
companies are advantageous. 
Trade openness is enhanced 
when domestic companies 
increase their transactions 
with foreign countries. The 
possible gains from the 
activities of multinational 
affiliates in developing 
countries have been explored 
in the following two areas. 
One is technology spillovers to 
domestic companies (Haddad 
& Harrison, 1993; Kokko, 
1994; Aitken & Harrison, 
1999; Blomstrom & Sjoholm, 
1999). The other is wage 
Fall 2004 
spillovers to domestic 
companies (Aitken, Harrison, 
& Lipsey 1996; Feenstra & 
Hanson 1997); however, as 
Lipsey (2002) points out, little 
attention has been given to the 
effects of Foreign Direct 
Investment, henceforth FDI, 
on consumers in the literature. 
This article relates two 
branches of the literature: 
trade openness and inward 
FDI (i.e., the presence of 
foreign affiliates in host 
countries). The possible gains 
of an open-door policy to the 
markets in developing 
countries by examining the 
effects of inward FDI on 
market size is investigated. For 
this purpose, two alternative 
industrial policies are 
compared. One policy would 
involve the promotion of a 
domestic company. The 
second policy would require 
the hosting of a foreign-owned 
multinational company. 
The model falls among 
those found in the standard 
industrial organization 
literature on the interrelated 
markets (the seminal work of 
Spengler, 1950; Greenhut & 
Ohta, 1979; Tirole, 1988) 
and the more recent ones that 
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appear in the literature on the 
taxation of multinational 
companies (Horst, 1971; 
Copithorne, 1971; Eden, 
1985; Kant, 1990; Prusa, 
1990; Gresik & Nelson, 
1994; Stoughton & Talmor, 
1994; Bond & Gresik, 1996). 
Specifically, a theoretical 
model is constructed by 
referring to the recent tax 
regulations concerning 
multinational companies 
(Elitzur & Mintz, 1996; 
Tomohara, 2004). 
Furthermore, the analysis 
focuses on the vertical model 
of a multinational company. 
The knowledge-capital model 
predicts the emergence of 
vertically integrated 
multinational companies when 
countries differ in relative 
factor endowments (Markusen 
et al., 1996; Markusen, 
1997; Carr, Markusen & 
Maskus, 2001; Markusen & 
Maskus, 2002; Blonigen, 
Davies, & Head, 2003). Such 
differences in relative factor 
endowments between 
developing and developed 
countries are often observed. 
Analysis reveals the 
possibility an open-door policy 
will improve the welfare of 
consumers through the 
increased trade of 
multinational companies. If 
the markets between a 
developed country and a 
developing country are 
interrelated through intra-firm 
trade by multinational 
companies, the developing 
country's domestic market 
becomes larger as the volume 
of trade increases. This is 
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because a multinational 
company tries to maximize its 
global profits by exporting 
more goods to the host 
country. The multinational 
company creates new demand 
by providing goods at a lower 
price than a domestic 
company does, even if both 
companies have the same cost 
and production functions and, 
thus, face the same demand 
for the goods. The results of 
the analysis complement the 
previously recognized link 
between trade openness and 
economic growth. Further-
more, the results provide a 
theoretical foundation for the 
claim that an industrial policy 
encouraging the presence of 
foreign-owned multinational 
companies will enlarge the 
economy of host countries 
through trade promotion. It is 
concluded that industrial 
policy tied with foreign-owned 
multinational companies is a 
potential catalyst for 
enhancing the size of a 
domestic market, creating job 
opportunities, and inducing 
technology transfer. Therefore, 
policies encouraging the 
presence of foreign-owned 
multinational companies are 
effective engines of economic 
growth. 
The next section describes 
a model for studying the 
effects of two previously 
mentioned industrial policies 
on the size of the market in a 
developing country. The 
difference in trade patterns 
under such policies clarifies 
the mechanisms through 
which trade by foreign 
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multinational companies 
enlarges the size of the 
markets in comparison with 
the trade of domestic 
companies. Concluding 
remarks off er directions for 
future research. 
Model 
Consider the situation in 
which governments in deve-
loping countries have two 
alternative industrial policies 
for the development of their 
economies. One is protecting 
their infant domestic indus-
tries and/or promoting state-
owned companies. The other 
is inducing foreign direct 
investment and encouraging 
the establishment of multi-
national companies in their 
countries. The two different 
market structures are 
compared and the effects of 
their different trade patterns 
on domestic market size are 
examined. 
Foreign-Owned Multinational 
Monopoly 
The markets across two 
countries are interrelated 
through an intra-firm 
transaction of a vertically 
integrated multinational 
company. The vertical model 
is the knowledge-capital model 
that predicts the emergence of 
vertically integrated multi-
national companies when 
countries differ in relative 
factor endowments. The 
knowledge-capital model 
explains why the different 
patterns of multinational 
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companies evolve endog-
enously. Consider the 
relationship between two 
countries: a developing 
country that hosts multi-
national companies and a 
developed country where the 
parents of multinational 
companies are based. The 
differences in relative factor 
endowments between the two 
countries are often observed. 
The model says that 
multinational activities are 
motivated by the differences 
in relative endowments since 
vertically integrated multi-
national companies are likely 
to emerge in order to exploit 
the differences. 
Trade within a firm is 
modeled as a manufacturing 
process from a parent factory 
in an upstream location to 
assembly factories located in 
the destination market 
(Helpman, 1984; Helpman & 
Krugman, 1985). A typical 
example is a parent company 
in the developed country 
producing and exporting 
intermediate goods that are 
further assembled or 
manufactured by a subsidiary 
in the developing country. 
Final goods are sold in the 
developing country's market. 
Following the traditional 
vertical integration literature, 
the intra-firm transaction is 
characterized to be a fixed-
coefficient production function 
(Greenhut & Ohta, 1979). Let 
q > 0 be the quantity of the 
intermediate goods produced 
by the multinational parent in 
the developed country, and Q 
> 0 be the quantity of the 
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final goods processed by the 
subsidiary in the developing 
country. The production 
function is Q = aq, where a 
is a positive constant, 
assuming that the amount of a 
local input required for the 
production is proportional to 
q. We use the special case of a 
= 1, as is commonly observed 
in the transfer pricing 
literature. With the proper 
choice of units, one unit of the 
intermediate goods is required 
to produce one unit of the 
final good. 
The transfer price of the 
intra-firm trade is regulated as 
in the current tax system. The 
transfer price is denoted as 
0 = (1 + k )ch with a positive 
constant mark-up rate k. The 
mark-up is an advanced agree-
ment among a multinational 
company and two govern-
ments. It is determined as if 
the intra-firm transaction took 
place between non-associated 
parties in the market. This is 
so called the Bilateral 
Advanced Pricing Agreement 
(BAPA) case, in which tax 
authorities in the two 
countries agree to use the 
same arm's length price so as 
to eliminate the risk of double 
taxation. Recent work in this 
area (Elitzur & Mintz, 1996; 
Tomohara, 2004) considers 
the Advanced Pricing Agree-
ment case using a similar (or 
the same) analytical 
framework. 1 In practice, the 
mark up ratio is usually 
decided by referring to market 
conditions at the industry 
level. The mark-up rate 
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guarantees that the positive 
profits will be allocated to 
each country under the 
current tax system (where the 
source of taxation rights relies 
on national sovereignty). 
The company is assumed 
to have a monopoly on its 
differentiated goods in the 
host country. One interpreta-
tion of this assumption is that 
the potential size of the 
market is not large enough due 
to the scale economy of the 
industries. 2 Let the inverse 
demand function for final 
goods in the host market be 
p = p(q), where p is the price 
of the final goods. The price is 
assumed to be continuous and 
twice differentiable, strictly 
monotonically decreasing, and 
concave in the quantity of 
output. 
The factor markets are 
characterized to be 
competitive (either in the 
developed or developing 
country) because many local 
companies provide non-
differentiated parts necessary 
for production. A simple linear 
cost function C; = c,q, where c; 
is a positive constant marginal 
cost in location i is used. The 
location is denoted as i = h for 
the developed country and i = 
f for the developing country, 
A multinational company 
chooses output (which impacts 
the volume of trade) to 
maximize after-tax profits of 
the group. Global profit 
maximization is assumed, as is 
typical in the literature, 
though companies may have 
multiple objectives and could 
possibly benefit from decen-
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tralization . Each affiliate pays 
corporate income taxes in its 
resident country calculated at 
a corporate tax rate t;, In 
addition, a tariff is charged by 
customs in the host country, 
at a rate r, on the import of 
the intermediate goods. The 
after-tax global profits of the 
multinational company are 
expressed as the sum of 
profits earned in the two 
countries: 
[
(1 - 1)(0 - c)+ J 
n = (1 - , ) q 
(p(q) - (i+r)0 - c) 
(1) 
The first-order condition 
(which is also a sufficient 
condition) provides the 
fami liar, but slightly modified, 
relationship with the after-tax 
marginal revenue equated to 
the after-tax marginal cost at 
the group level: 
(1 - 1,)(0 - c,) + 
(1 - 1) 
Domestic Monopoly 
(2) 
A domestic company 
imports intermediate goods 
from foreign companies in 
developed countries and 
manufactures them with non-
differentiated parts, which are 
purchased from small-sized 
domestic companies. Final 
goods are sold at the 
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developing country's local 
market, where the company 
has a monopoly on its goods. 
The manufacturing process 
arises when the company does 
not have the know-how to 
produce intermediate goods. 
This situation applies to many 
developing countries, where 
quality control does not work 
at the local level. The lack of 
quality control is due to the 
unskilled labor force and high 
costs of training local persons 
on advanced technology 
UETRO, 1997). 
The domestic company has 
the same technology structure 
as the multinational company. 
Consumers in the developing 
country have the same 
preferences for final goods 
produced either by the domes-
tic or multinational company. 
These assumptions imply that 
both the multinational and the 
domestic companies produce 
identical final goods and 
eliminate the possibilities that 
the different quality of final 
goods affects the size of the 
markets. In the model, the 
strategic decision-making 
about the quantity of output 
(and, thus, the volume of 
trade) is the only difference 
between the multinational 
company and the domestic 
company. This simplification 
allows for insight into the 
impacts of two industrial 
policies on the size of the 
market by focusing on their 
different trade patterns, 
The after-tax profit of the 
domestic company is a stan-
dard monopoly problem: 
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TI=(I-t) 
(p(q)-(1 + r)0- c,)q 
(3) 
The first-order condition 
(which is also a sufficient 
condition) provides the 
familiar relationship of 
marginal revenue equal to 
marginal cost : 
dp 
-q+p(q)= 
dq 
(1 + 1' )0 + C 
I 
Globalization for 
Development? 
(4) 
This section examines the 
effects of an open-door 
industrial policy on the size of 
the markets in developing 
countries. If the markets 
between a developed country 
and a developing country are 
interrelated through the trade 
of a multinational company, 
comparison of the two cases 
above reveals that the market 
is enlarged via increased trade 
volume. The result agrees with 
the recognized linkage 
between trade openness and 
economic growth. In addition, 
the result provides a 
theoretical foundation for the 
claim that international trade 
initiated by multinational 
companies has the potential to 
improve the economic 
performance of developing 
countries. 
Theorem: A foreign-owned 
monopolistic 
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multinational company 
increases the size of 
the market in the host 
country to a greater 
extent than would the 
trade of a domestic 
company with mono-
poly power. 
Proof: Appendix. 
When the markets 
between a developed country 
and a developing country are 
interrelated through the trade 
of a multinational company, 
the size of the market in the 
developing country is 
enhanced through an increase 
in the volume of trade across 
the two countries. The reason 
for this is the self-interest of 
the multinational company. 
The company tries to 
maximize its global profits by 
exporting more goods to the 
host country. More formally, 
maximizing global profits 
requires a larger amount of 
output than maximizing the 
profit of an affiliate in the 
host country. One can easily 
understand the claim because 
the profit in the home country 
is monotonically increasing in 
output (or the volume of 
trade). On the other hand, as 
established previously, the 
condition of profit 
maximization for the domestic 
company is the same as profit 
maximizing condition for the 
multinational affiliate in the 
host country. It is concluded 
that, due to the presence of 
the foreign multinational 
company, the market expands 
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relative to its size when there 
is only the domestic company. 
An important point to note 
is that a multinational 
company enhances the size of 
the market by providing the 
same quality of goods at a 
lower price than a domestic 
company (see Figure). Thus, 
the presence of multinational 
companies creates new 
demand for the goods in the 
local markets of developing 
countries. Consumers whose 
reservation price was initially 
below the price offered by the 
domestic company, yet equal 
to or above the price charged 
by the multinational company, 
are now able to purchase the 
good. Such an increase in 
demand may have a further 
desirable impact on the 
economy of these countries via 
the multiplier effects of 
consumption. This effect will 
be larger than the model 
predicts if more realistic 
assumptions are introduced. 
For example, multinational 
companies have some 
technological and management 
advantages compared to 
domestic companies and, thus, 
can provide better quality of 
products at lower prices. 
One may wonder whether 
the result is related to the 
classic double marginalization 
argument. Each unit of output 
sold in the developing country 
is produced from a unit of 
input produced in the 
developed country. The 
domestic company imports 
those inputs at the arm's 
length price and operates as a 
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monopolist in the market. It 
seems possible that the result 
in this article could be 
interpreted as an efficiency 
loss due to the monopoly 
mark-up of the domestic 
company; however, the 
mechanism is not exactly the 
same. The multinational 
company in this model is also 
segregated into two affiliates 
under the current jurisdic-
tional tax system. The 
company purchases intermedi-
ate products at the same price 
as the domestic company and 
is not able to internalize the 
cost of intra-firm trans-
actions. 3 Rather, the cause of 
the enlarged market is due to 
the self-interest of multi-
national companies. Since the 
multinational company is a 
producer of the input (and the 
output), producing and 
exporting more intermediate 
goods contributes to 
maximizing its global profits. 
This is not the case for the 
domestic company. 
Although the multinational 
company is motivated to 
export more goods, dumping is 
not the cause of the enlarged 
market in the developing 
country. This is because tax 
regulations (i.e., BAPA) 
prevent the multinational 
company from selling its goods 
below the actual cost in the 
current model. Remember how 
the set-up of the mark-up ratio, 
k. The enlarged market is 
obtained solely from the self-
interest of the multinational 
company maximizing global 
profits. This argument will 
9 
Figure 
Production Decisions of Companies 
price 
MR 
q., quantity 
MR : the marginal revenue of a domestic company 
MCd : the marginal cost of a domestic company 
MC,,, : the adjusted after-tax marginal cost of a multinational company* 
q,1 the optimal level of the market for a domestic company 
l/m : the optimal level of the market for a multinational company 
•The first-order condition of a multinational company: 
(1 -1• )0 +(t - 11 {! q+ p )= (t - 1.)c• +(I-If )((l+r)O +cf). 
After-tax marginal revenue = After-tax marginal cost. 
To make the comparison easier, rearrange it as 
dpq+p=( l +r)0+c1 - p(iJ-c,.), where p= l -r• > 0. dq J-11 
Denote the right-hand side of the equation as 
become clearer when dumping 
is discussed. 
One final remark is that 
inward FDI is not a unique 
solution. The analysis implies 
that the size of the market in 
developing countries will 
increase when the markets 
across host and home 
countries are interrelated by 
the intra-firm trade of 
multinational companies . 
Theoretically, outward FDI 
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MCm =(I + r)0 + C_r - p(B - ch). 
could achieve the same goal. A 
domestic company could 
acquire a foreign input sup-
plier and vertically integrate 
its business backward; 
however, this is seldom 
observed in developing coun-
tries. 
Applications 
This section considers two 
different scenarios . They are 
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related to the issues of double 
marginalization and dumping. 
Although the two issues often 
concern scholars, they are not 
realistic given current tax and 
trade regulations. In both 
cases, either the developing 
host country or the developed 
country is not able to raise tax 
revenue . This is because the 
two scenarios do not allocate a 
positive profit of the multi-
national company to both 
Southern Business Review 
countries. Furthermore, 
dumping is strictly regulated 
under trade policy; however, 
the following discussion 
reveals that the result is not 
specific to the situation in the 
previous section and is still 
valid in other cases. 
Double marginalization. 
Suppose a single supplier in an 
upstream location produces 
intermediate goods and sells 
them to a single retailer in a 
downstream location. The 
retailer sells final goods. The 
upstream supplier and the 
downstream retailer each have 
monopoly power. The price of 
the final products includes 
two successive mark-ups (or 
marginalization). The supplier 
charges a mark-up when 
selling the intermediate goods 
to the retailer and the retailer 
charges another mark-up when 
selling the final goods to 
consumers. This is called 
double marginalization. Once 
the two companies integrate 
their businesses vertically, the 
mark-up charged by the 
supplier disappears. A 
vertically-integrated monopoly 
enhances the size of the 
market allows consumers to 
purchase a larger quantity at a 
lower price. 
The story is about two 
domestic companies; however, 
it is possible to extend the 
argument to the situation in 
which two affiliates of a 
multinational company reside 
in different countries. The 
upstream supplier corresponds 
to the parent company in the 
developed country and the 
retailer in the downstream 
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location to the subsidiary in 
the developing country. The 
situation in which the mark-up 
charged by the parent 
disappears is modeled as 
k = 0. After following a 
similar discussion as in the 
proof of Theorem, the 
conclusion reached is the 
multinational company regime 
attains a larger market size in 
the developing country than 
the domestic company regime 
(see Appendix). The result is 
intuitive since k = 0 is the 
special case of Theorem. 
Dumping. "Under 
international law, a firm is 
dumping if it sells its product 
abroad at a price below its 
domestic price or below its 
actual costs" (Carlton & 
Perloff, 1994, p. 758). For 
example, if the parent exports 
the intermediate goods to the 
subsidiary at $25,000 per 
unit, but non-related parties 
conduct a similar transaction 
at $30,000 per unit (this is 
called a comparable trans-
action), the multinational 
company is said to be 
dumping. 
It is reasonable to believe 
that dumping enhances the 
size of the market in the 
developing country. This is 
because the subsidiary can 
import the intermediate goods 
at a lower cost; however, the 
story is not so simple. It is 
necessary to distinguish the 
two cases. Denote the mark-
up ratio when the multi-
national company is dumping 
as kd. One is modeled as the 
case, 0 < kd < k, and the 
other is as the case, -1 < kd < 
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0. In the former case, Theorem 
derived in the previous section 
is always valid (see Appendix}, 
but the latter case is slightly 
complicated. Suppose the 
parent company in the 
developed country exports the 
intermediate goods at a price 
below marginal cost. The 
output decision of the 
company is affected by the 
trade-off effect between the 
gain from saving tariff 
payment and the loss from the 
decrease in the parent's profit. 
Theorem is still valid, if the 
corporate tax rate in the 
developing country is lower 
than the one in the developed 
country. This is because, 
roughly speaking, the gain and 
loss are weighted by the two 
tax rates respectively (see 
Appendix). In reality, observed 
corporate tax rates in 
developing countries are much 
lower than the ones in 
developed countries (e.g., 
KPMG, 1998). Given the 
current tax rates, hosting 
multinational companies 
would benefit developing 
countries via enhanced market 
size. 
Market size and mark-up 
ratio. Three cases are con-
sidered: BAPA (k > 0), vertical 
integration (k = 0), and 
dumping (0 < kd < k or -1 < 
kd <0). The analysis shows 
that, in all three cases, hosting 
a multinational company 
would yield greater benefit to 
consumers in the developing 
country than would promotion 
of a domestic company. One 
may wonder whether there is 
any relationship between 
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market size and the mark-up 
ratio, k. Suppose the 
developing country levies a 
lower tax rate than the 
developed country. The size of 
the market increases if the 
multinational company 
charges a lower transfer price. 
The result shows that 
companies use dumping as a 
str;i tegv to incre,rne sales in 
host countries. 
Proposition. Suppose the 
lilx rate in the developing 
country, t1, is smaller than the 
one in developed country, t1,. 
A larger market size, q, is 
illtainecl with a lower mark-up 
r;1tio, Ii. 
Proof: Appendix. 
Concluding Remarks 
This article illustrates that 
foreign direct investment by 
multinational companies, 
rather than protection of an 
infant domestic company, 
yields a larger market and, 
therefore, fosters growth. The 
analysis shows that, if the 
markets between a developed 
and a developing country are 
interrelated through the intra-
firm trade of a multinational 
company, the size of the 
domestic market exp;inds 
through increased trade 
volume because the multi-
natim1;il company tries to 
maximize its global profits by 
exporting more goods to the 
developing country. Therefore, 
the multinational company can 
provide final goods to local 
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consumers at a lower price 
than the domestic company. 
This creates new demand for 
the goods in the local markets. 
These results are also valid in 
other scenarios. 
The current analysis 
provides a theoretical 
foundation to the 
multinational enterprise 
(MNE) network hypothesis. 
The MNE hypothesis claims 
that "increasing imported 
inputs arc related to growing 
inward FDI; higher input 
imports would result from 
intense trading between 
MNE's affiliates in foreign 
countries and (parent) 
companies of the home 
country" (OECD, 2002, 
p.80). This article extends the 
idea and shows that higher 
input imports by multinational 
companies have the potential 
to enhance the host markets. 
This will benefit local 
consumers in developing 
countries. 
The analytical framework 
is applicable to other 
interesting but more 
complicated situations. One 
possible extension is to 
examine the impacts of the 
two industrial policies on 
profits and tax revenues. 
Sizable tax revenues arc often 
needed to finance social 
policies in developing 
countries, where large-scale 
companies play a dominant 
role in the economy. Raising 
tax revenues is an important 
policy concern of governments 
in those countries. Other 
possible extensions are to 
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include exchange rates and 
foreign tax credits and 
deductions. Although this 
requires appropriate modifica-
tions to the model, the main 
conclusion in this article will 
still hold. The literature such 
as Baccetta and Wincoop 
(2000) reports a weak linkage 
between exchange rate 
stability and trade. One last 
extension is to examine the 
relevance of the analysis using 
data. An index of ownership-
weighted trade openness into 
the models of previous 
empirical literatures on ,J 
relationship between trade and 
growth should be introduced. 
It could be obtained by taking 
the ratio of the amount of 
trade conducted by multi-
national companies to the 
amount of trade in the 
country. Then, trade openness 
could be multiplied by the 
ratio. All of these topics 
represent potential future lines 
of research. 
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Endnotes 
1. The model in Elitzur and 
Mintz (1996) studies an APA 
case, in which tax authorities 
in each jurisdiction apply a 
different arm's length method; 
however, this may cause 
international double taxation. 
To avoid the problem, 
Tomohara (2004) considers a 
BAPA case in which two 
governments and a 
multinational company agree 
to a mark-up ratio. Discussion 
of the BAPA framework is a 
relevant topic. The number of 
the applicants to the system in 
reality is increasing. 
2. For example, Honda 
occupies about 70% of the 
motorcycle market in 
Thailand. 
3. Tomohara (2004) shows 
that independent domestic tax 
policies under the BAPA 
system cause efficiency losses. 
BAPAs segregate profits 
earned by two different 
affiliates within the same 
company for the purpose of 
imposing the tax indepen-
dently. The degree of the 
inefficiency increases with a 
larger mark-up rate. A positive 
mark-up ratio operates as a 
proxy of a hazard index that 
measures the degree under 
which BAPAs hinder the 
integration of multinational 
companies. Inefficiency will be 
overcome by a zero mark-up 
ratio. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 
The result is easily obtained by comparing (2) and (4) as in Figure. First, denote the marginal 
revenue of the domestic company MR(= ! q + p(q)) and the marginal cost MCd (= (1 + r)0 + c 1 ). The 
optimal level of the market qd is decided at the point, where MR is equated to MC . Next, to make 
the comparison easier, rearrange (2) as 
dp - - 1-t 
-q+p=(l+r)0+c1 -p(0 - ch), where p=--h >0 (5). dq 1-t f 
The last inequality is obtained from the assumption 1 > I; > 0, where i E (h,f). Denote the right-
hand side of the equation as MCm (= (I + r )0 + c 1 - p( 0 - ch)) and the optimal level of the market when a 
foreign multinational company dominates the market as qm. With these notations, qm is decided at 
the point, where MR is equated to MCm. Finally, the relationship qm > qd is true once we show that 
the difference between MCd and MCm is positive, i.e., p(B -ch)> 0 . The inequality is always 
satisfied from the assumption, 0 - ch = kch > 0 . /// 
Proof of the Statement in Double Marginalization 
Substitute k = 0 into MCm in the proof of Theorem. This makes MCm to MC:;;' =(I+ r)ch + c I that 
is smaller than MC d • I I I 
Proof of the Statement in Dumping 
Denote the right hand side of Equation (5) as MC; =(I+ r)(l + kd )ch +cf - pkdch, when the 
multinational company is dumping. Once we demonstrate that the inequality, MC! - MCd < 0, holds, 
the proof is done. If O < kd < k , MC~ - MCd is always negative since the difference is expressed as 
(o + r)(kd -k)- pkd )ch ./// 
Show if 0<t1 < t,.,then MC~ - MCd<O for all kd such as -l<kd<O. Suppose MC~-MCd ~ O for 
some kd, then kd (pk ) . This implies (1 + r) < p from k > 0. However, 0 < t 1 < th implies 1- /(l+r) 
(0 <)p < 1. Contradiction./// 
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Proof of Proposition 
From Figure, a larger output is attained with a smaller MCm. If a smaller mark-up ratio reduces 
MC,;, , then the proof is done. Differentiating MCm with respect to k gives (1 +. - p h. This is always 
positive since O < t 1 < th implies (0 <)p < I .I I I 
Fall 2004 Southern Business Review 
